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ABSTRACT
This article explores the relationship between the bodily presence of 
other humans in the lived urban world and the experience of everyday 
architecture. We suggest, from the perspectives of phenomenology 
and architecture, that being in the company of others changes 
the way the built environment appears to subjects, and that this 
enables us to perform simple daily tasks while still attending to 
the built environment (to a certain, relatively minimal degree). Our 
analysis shows that in mundane urban settings attending to the 
environment involves a unique attentional mode, which does not rely 
on concentrating on, or appreciating the architectural objects, but 
rather on social attention and on the subject’s kinesthesis in relation 
to the built environment.
1. Introduction
The purpose of this article is to clarify the role of the bodily presence of others in facilitat-
ing our everyday experience of the built environment, where, typically, the built objects 
do not capture our full-focused attention, yet are involved in our daily experience of the 
urban world.
Alfred Schutz suggests that our world is always already colored by the attitudes of others 
with whom we interact.1 He maintains:
that my attitudes become always less specifically colored by myself, that they always become 
more typical the more they accommodate those of everyone else, or, so to speak, become 
always more anonymous.2
Schutz’s investigations show that other humans, directly and indirectly, influence many of 
our attitudes and experiences. This is particularly evident in the lived urban world, in which 
subjects constantly encounter (or expect to encounter) one another. First, the presence of 
others changes the way the built environment appears to the subject. Second, encountering 
others in everyday urban settings enables subjects to perform different simple daily routines 
while still attending to their built surroundings.3
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This suggests that in the urban world built objects are usually not in the center of our 
attention yet are still part of our attentional field. In what follows, we argue that this unique 
mode of appearance relies, among other things, on the broadness and the dynamic struc-
ture of the human field of attention and on the bodily relation between subject and other. 
Drawing on phenomenological analyses, mainly on the work of Aron Gurwitsch4 and Alfred 
Schutz,5 and on architectural perspectives of the structure of the (built) lived world, we show 
that the attentional experience of others (actual or potential), along with the subject’s sense 
of their own bodily kinesthesis in relation to their built surroundings, profoundly influences 
the experience of the everyday built environment.
A phenomenological perspective shows that human attention comprises different modes 
of noticing.6 These modes modulate the subject’s perceptual field,7 especially where the 
experience involves others. In everyday urban settings, other subjects are not merely the 
unnoticed background of what is in the center of our attention, rather their bodily presence 
influences our experience of the built surroundings. Being in the direct company of others 
changes the way the urban environment appears to subjects and enables us to attend to more 
in this environment, while still being preoccupied with our daily routines. For example, the 
presence of others in the immediate (built) environment diminishes the subject’s need to 
focus on identifying potential hazards or threats.8
Others do not only carry our attention in the everyday built surroundings, their bodily 
presence also influences the construction of our lived urban world. This is particularly 
evident once other subjects are no longer available to us in our everyday built settings, in 
which case, the urban environment changes. The absence of others suddenly colors it with 
uncertainty and uncanniness. I no longer attend to it as a familiar place, and this influences 
the way it appears to me. This suggests that other subjects play a crucial role in our lived 
urban world, both in broadening our field of attention and in constituting the everydayness 
of the built environment.
This suggestion unfolds in this article in the following manner. First, we propose that 
in everyday urban settings architectural objects do not usually appear in the center of 
our attention, yet we nevertheless still attend to them. We support our view with Aron 
Gurwitsch’s understanding of the broadness and richness of the human field of attention. 
Then, drawing on phenomenological perspectives and on empirical studies, we point to the 
crucial role of social attention in constructing the subject’s lived world. Based on Gurwitsch’s 
model and on our understanding of social attention, we then argue that the bodily presence 
of others is essential for the construction of the subject’s everyday experience of the built 
environment. We support our position with Schutz’s analysis of the structure of subjects’ 
direct encounters. Finally, by examining the influence of the absence of others on the 
experiences of the everyday built environment, we show how other subjects construct the 
subject’s lived urban world.
A quick note regarding our theoretical toolkit; According to our suggestion, social atten-
tion, the experience of attending to and with other human subjects, is a special mode of 
attention, different in feel and in what it enables subjects to do from other types of atten-
tion, such as attending to non-human objects. The everyday built environment is regarded 
herein as the built urban setting(s) in which the subject lives and acts, particularly her 
daily surroundings such as familiar residential and commercial streets, public squares and 
boulevards, business districts etc.
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2. The structure of everyday experience of the built environment
2.1. The everydayness of the built world
In everyday life, the built world usually does not require our (focal) attention. Walking 
down the street, we may ponder our daily tasks, talk to a friend, or argue over the phone, 
while still attending (to some extent) to the urban surroundings. These everyday practices 
are part of the way we experience the built environment as “ordinary” or “mundane.” In 
his essay “The work of art in the age of its technological reproducibility,”9 Walter Benjamin 
describes this state as one of “distracted reception.” Benjamin employs the word ‘distraction’ 
to underscore the very essence of the everyday architectural experience, in which, in daily 
life, without radical changes such as unexpected disturbance, subjects do not usually need 
to focus on their built surroundings. He suggests that, in mundane situations—in contrast 
to an encounter with a work of art—architecture is primarily perceived in a state of habit-
ual distraction.10 We are familiar with a place and act within it almost without noticing 
or reflecting on it. This type of experience is far removed from the concentrated attention 
lavished, for example, upon a unique building.11
Importantly, although built objects do not capture our full-focused attention in this 
state of “distraction,” they are involved in constructing our experience of the everyday 
built world through the dynamic body-place relation.12 That is to say, the way built objects 
appear to us in daily situations is bound up with the subject’s kinesthesis in relation to the 
built environment (and with the bodily presence of other subjects) and is involved in the 
construction of our sense of everydayness.
In the lived world the body-place relation unfolds, as Maurice Merleau-Ponty suggests, 
“through the agency of my body… I have the positing of objects through that of my body, 
or conversely the positing of my body through that of objects…. because my body is a 
movement towards the world.”13 Crucially, in urban settings this relation materializes in a 
special way. That is, the body intertwines with the built objects in a unique manner that stems 
from, among other things, the presupposition of the subject’s movement that is entrenched 
in the built environment.
More specifically, the urban environment is constructed by humans for the use of 
humans. Therefore, it already entails (in most cases) the bodily presence and movement 
of human subjects, as much as it affords them. Whereas natural environments afford the 
subject certain activities given the kind of body we have,14 the (lived) urban world presup-
poses our body, insofar as it is already designed in accordance with our bodily movements. 
This kinesthetic pregiveness is crucial for the construction of the subject’s experience of the 
everyday built environment, as it profoundly influences the way built objects are attended 
and perceived. Notably, the body-place interaction, which is embedded in the urban envi-
ronment to begin with, allows the construction of experiential properties involved in this 
mundane experience. In particular, it enables what Casey defines as the mode of bodily 
motion between places.15
In an earlier work one of us, Peri-Bader, uses an applied research method to show that 
everyday experience of architecture involves distinct spatiotemporal properties, such as 
light, space, scale, enclosure and flow.16 Importantly for our case, these properties are con-
structed through the subject’s movement in relation to the built environment. In other 
words, the properties that take part in the construction of the everyday experience of the 
lived urban world originate in the dynamic relationship between the subject and the (built) 
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environment. This suggests that the architectural setting is constantly involved in the man-
ifestation of the subject’s everydayness, even when it is not present in the center of the 
subject’s attention.
This suggestion is supported by phenomenological and ecological perspectives on the 
structure of human attention that show that in daily situations our attention to the environ-
ment depends on temporality and kinesthesis and involves a dynamic background.17 More 
specifically, in mundane experiences in the built environment, the directly-attended objects, 
whether they be our cell phone, our friend, or the fancy red car passing by, are always given 
to us with a background,18 which usually consists of architectural objects. These objects, as 
Benjamin’s observation suggests, are barely noticed, yet they appear to us. In urban settings 
this occurs mainly because we have a pre-reflective awareness of our body in relation to the 
built objects, an awareness that is influenced by the way urban environments are designed.19 
For example, the directionality and the size of a sidewalk in a busy business district and its 
relation to the buildings around it (in terms of scale, spatiality and materiality) presupposes 
the movement and the activities of its users, as much as it enables them.
The dynamic experiential structure, in which in daily situations architecture is (usually) 
part of the active attentional background,20 rather than the center of the subject’s attention, 
is of great importance for our welfare as it helps prevent the built world from forcing itself 
on us, demanding our full focal attention. This is crucial for the construction of the everyday 
experience of the urban environment21 as it is involved in the way we enact our attention22 
and perform simple daily tasks while still attending to the built objects around us. It takes 
an extraordinary situation or condition, such as a sudden disturbance or a particular fas-
cination, to generate a shift into focalization.23 This can occur, for example, when encoun-
tering an unexpected hazard or when facing an object that calls for appreciation.24 In other 
words, the everyday experience of the built world involves an active-dynamic attentional 
structure. Though certain (bottom-up) situations demand that we focus attention on the 
built surroundings, under ordinary circumstances architecture does not stand in the center 
of our attentional field, but nonetheless we still attend and experience it.
2.2. Aron Gurwitsch’s model of attention
Our view of the breadth of the human field of attention in everyday (urban) life is com-
patible with Gurwitsch’s phenomenological model, which suggests that attention includes 
more than what is (temporally) in the center of attention. Basing his discussion on Husserl’s 
analysis of the subject’s different attentional modes, including the “primarily” noticed and 
the almost unnoticed “secondary,”25 Gurwitsch holds that attention is not restricted solely 
to what is directly attended by the subjects. He points out that “we never deal with a theme 
simpliciter; instead, we confront a theme standing in a field.”26 This suggests that the sub-
ject’s attention is wider and richer than proposed by psychological accounts, which focus 
on the subject’s attentional limitations.27 Gurwitsch maintains that it is wrong to make a 
distinction between what appears in the center of our focal attention (the spotlighted object) 
and what is usually regarded (mistakenly) as unnoticed or unselected. He proposes that 
the “searchlight theory of attention has to be abandoned altogether,”28 proposing instead 
that (voluntary) attention is organized as a field. This attentional field, which is constantly 
active and dynamic, depending on the transient location of its center, comprises the center 
of attention, the thematic field (the context of the attended locus), and its margins. In our 
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case, although the built world does not appear in the center of our attention in everyday 
situations, it is always already part of our (field of) attention since it is placed within it.
Gurwitsch specifically acknowledges the importance of the environment (the built and 
the natural) in constructing the subject’s attention, stressing that the attended object is 
always located within its environment. This environment, which belongs to the domain 
of the co-given, does not merely appear to subjects as a non-intruding background (a sort 
of white screen or “noise”), but rather it is part of their attention, since “it is impossible 
to perceive a thing without environment.”29 However, while the built environment, under 
normal circumstances, is co-given with the attended center, and thus is always part of the 
subject’s attentional field, its relation to the center and its location within this field need 
further clarification. According to Gurwitsch’s view,30 not all that is co-given with the theme 
is directly connected to it. Gurwitsch distinguishes between items that are related to the 
center of attention and, therefore, determine the subject’s attitudes toward it, for example, 
the shaded colonnade I am crossing while looking at the entrance of the building, and other 
features in the environment that do not (directly) influence the subject’s attitude toward 
the attended object, such as, the wall behind the table on which my cup of coffee is placed.
The first circle of relatedness to the center of attention is the thematic field. Gurwitsch 
emphasizes that the theme “is inserted into this framework of senses,” which comprises a 
“set of materially related objects.”31 These objects are organized with reference to the center 
of attention and have a special relation to it. We suggest that in everyday built environments 
the thematic field includes material objects as well as spatial properties that influence the 
subject’s everydayness. These properties are involved in the flow of the experience construct-
ing the body-place relation,32 such as, the (ever-changing) distance between subjects and 
the buildings around them, the shadow these buildings (and trees) cast over the sidewalk 
as I walk on my way to work, the width of this sidewalk and its direction, and so on.33
The second attentional circle, namely the periphery (or the margin) of attention, consists 
of items that were left outside the thematic field, namely items that are connected to the 
center of attention solely by virtue of being given simultaneously with it.34 In my everyday 
built surroundings these features include, for example, particular architectural details, cars 
that I pass while walking on the sidewalk, the upper balconies on the buildings near me, the 
skyscrapers on the other side of the road, and backyards. Importantly, as Gurwitsch’s analysis 
suggests, these features and relations are neither absent from the subject’s attention nor are 
they merely static background for the transient center. Gurwitsch stresses that co-given 
items, whether they belong to the thematic field or not, are always part of the attentional 
field35 since they take part in forming and preserving it. Thus, attention is not “a matter of 
obscuring or brightening but is one of organization.”36
This phenomenological observation helps in elucidating the built world’s everydayness, 
as it suggests that in everyday urban life the subject’s attention is organized in a way that 
includes architecture (at different levels of relatedness to the center), but also prevents that 
architecture from imposing itself on the subject. In other words, the suggestion that the 
subject’s attention is a dynamic process that relies on organization explains why built objects 
are part of our attentional field and yet attending to them (though to a lesser degree) does 
not prevent us from performing simple daily routines at the same time. More specifically, 
the organization of the attentional field, such as the distance between the subject and the 
built objects within the field, and the directionality of the subject relative to these objects are 
involved in maintaining the flow of the lived urban world, which is crucial for establishing 
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the subject’s everydayness. This suggests that the built features toward which the subject’s 
body is temporally oriented (directly or through the bodily presence of other subjects), 
is constantly involved in constructing and maintaining the flow of the experience, while 
other items remain in the periphery since they (as yet) do not directly carry the subject’s 
movements in the lived urban world.
Furthermore, we suggest that, depending on subjects’ movements (and as shown next on 
their orientation toward others in the environment), current marginal items can become part 
of the new thematic field, and vice versa. For example, I can cross the street to the other side 
while arguing over the phone, and thus, the built objects that were in the periphery of my 
attention become my new point of relatedness. In the next section, we suggest that in daily 
situations in the built environment the construction of the subject’s dynamic attentional field 
usually already involves, and relies on, the bodily presence of other subjects. This extends our 
attentional field and profoundly influences the way the built environment appears to us.37
3. The influence of the bodily presence of other subjects on the subject’s 
everydayness
3.1. Social attention
In everyday life in the urban world architectural objects usually are not given to me alone, but 
also to the other people in my environment. This has a profound influence on the way I attend 
to the built world around me. In mundane situations in the lived urban world, the bodily 
presence of others is not merely part of the subject’s attentional field, but rather the dynamic 
structure of this field depends, under normal circumstances, on attending to and with other 
subjects, namely, on social attention.38 This suggestion is based on abundant studies from 
fields such as phenomenology, developmental psychology, and cognitive science that show 
that attending to and with other subjects plays a part in constructing the subject’s lived world.39
Fairly early in life, infants already exhibit distinct propensities to detect and follow 
social cues embedded in other subjects’ bodies, such as potential threats, opportunities for 
cooperation, and interesting features to be explored.40 The primary bias to attend to other 
humans gradually develops, through infant-caregiver dyadic attentional engagements,41 into 
the triadic form of joint attention.42 This social capacity enables the subject, when jointly 
attending with others, to gain their perspectives toward the attended locus, through their 
gestures, gaze, movements, and posture. Notably, this crucial capacity influences the devel-
opment of more refined intersubjective traits, such as the capacity to cooperate with others 
and to understand their mental states.43 Furthermore, during infancy the infant develops 
a distinct inclination, which is bound up with social attention, towards social referencing, 
i.e., following cues from other people in the environment (particularly their caregivers), 
about which actions to take.44
The importance of social attention for subjects’ development and welfare is also shown 
by cognitive research that reveals that in everyday life attending to and with other human 
subjects provides the subject with important experiential and informational advantages. 
For example, by attending to, and with others I can understand their intentions in reach-
ing for an object45 or in pointing to a specific location. I can share their perspectives by 
following their gaze and their posture,46 and I can synchronize my movements, emotions 
and experiences with theirs when attending to the same environment.47 Furthermore, a 
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growing body of evidence suggests that the subject’s attention to others’ bodies is based 
on specific neuronal mechanisms designed to recognize and process social information.48 
This encourages subjects to rely on others as a source of information regarding the shared 
world,49 and diminishes their reliance on their own, more limited, attentional resources.
3.2. The bodily other and the lived environment
The empirical resources that suggest that social attention is involved in constructing the 
subject’s everydayness are in line with phenomenological views that show that in the lived 
world, the bodily presence of others profoundly influences my experiences, attitudes and 
perspectives toward it. Husserl suggests that when living with others in the social world 
I take part in their lives, and vice versa. As he puts it “but in living with one another 
[Miteinanderleben] each one can take part in the life of the others.”50 Others do not only 
grant the subject important informational and experiential advantages, but importantly, as 
Zahavi suggests,51 it is through their bodily presence that the world is first experienced by 
the subject as objective and as real.52 In other words, it is only insofar as the other subject 
appears to subjects as a differentiated other that the world opens up for them as a world 
already inhabited, therefore communal and objective, and this constitutes inter-subjectivity 
in its bodily sense.
Schutz’s analysis of the structure of the social world shows that when encountering other 
subjects in my environment I already attend to them as social agents who share my world, 
through whom I can obtain valuable knowledge about our common environment, and with 
whom I can share experiences and coordinate activities.53 Schutz emphasizes that the other 
person whom I can directly experience is the one who shares with me community of space 
and time: “when his experience is flowing side by side with mine […] When I can at any 
moment look over and grasp his thoughts as they come into being […] Persons [are] thus 
in reach of each other’s direct experience.”54 He maintains that when living with others I 
can “directly experience them and their subjective experiences.”55 This often occurs through 
their bodily presence in my immediate environment: “the spatial immediacy of the other in 
virtue of which his body is present to me as a field of expression for his subjective experi-
ences.”56 The social quality that emanates from the (bodily) presence of my fellow humans 
enables subjects to coordinate activities and perspectives with one another. As Gurwitsch 
points out, when directly encountering others, “we interlock and interlink our intentions, 
designs and activities with theirs in thoroughgoing mutuality and interplay.”57
Additionally, and crucially for our discussion, my relation to the other’s body is essen-
tially different from my relation to natural objects. As Sartre suggests,58 the other’s body 
“is revealed to me as a tool possessing the property of knowing.”59 That is, unlike the built 
objects, other subjects, like me, are provided with sense organs, therefore, their bodies 
appear to me as a point of view “on which I can take a point of view.” They are uniquely 
given to me “as an immediate existence,” as “a pure in itself.”60 Importantly for the case of 
the urban world, the other’s body always already appears to me in a situation; I grasp it in 
the context of contingency. Consequently, the future movements of other subjects as well 
as the organization of objects in relation to their active bodies (actual or as a possibility) is 
given to me when they appear in my field of attention in everyday situations.
This suggests that when living and operating together in a common world I am constantly 
attuned to, and rely on, the perspectives embedded in the bodies of the other subjects whom 
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I directly encounter.61 Therefore, my attentional field in everyday situations in the lived 
urban world involves others in a way that is different from my attention to non-human 
objects.
3.3. The bodily other and the subject’s attentional field
This last suggestion brings us back to Gurwitsch. As Gurwitsch’s model suggests, in everyday 
life the human attentional field includes different items that are given to subjects in different 
degrees of relatedness. In mundane situations, this field also comprises other subjects in the 
environment.62 These others can be in the center of the subject’s focal attention, for example, 
my colleague to whom I talk when walking together to the office; they can be part of the 
subject’s thematic field, such as the person who walks on the sidewalk beside me when I 
contemplate my daily tasks; and they can be in the periphery of my attentional field, for 
example the subjects walking on the other side of the street.
Evidently, as the research on social attention suggests, these others already appear to the 
subject with their perspectives and attitudes toward the environment as embedded in their 
bodily kinesthesis and facial expressions.63 This has a profound influence on the construc-
tion of subjects’ relation to the built environment. Whether they appear in the center of 
attention, in my thematic field, or in the periphery of my attentional field, the perspectives 
of other subjects toward the daily urban environment (in different degree of relatedness) 
are available to me when they are part of my attentional field. Moreover, even before we 
have encountered each other, I am already predisposed to rely on their behavior as social 
referencing of events in my surroundings.64 This suggests that the bodily presence of others 
in my immediate everyday environment (such as, a street, a public square, or my gym) 
reduces my need to concentrate attention on the built world around, and this influences 
my experience of my mundane urban surroundings.
Notably, these others appear to me in different degrees of intensity in accordance with 
my relation to them and with their temporal location within my field of attention. Schutz’s 
analysis clarifies this suggestion, emphasizing:
The partner, for instance, may be experienced with different degrees of immediacy, different 
degrees of intensity or different degrees of intimacy. Or he may be experienced from different 
points of view; he may appear within the center of attention or its periphery…65
This shows that the perspectives of others toward the built environment that we share are 
always available to me when directly encountering them, even when they are not in the 
center of attention. For example, when walking in my everyday urban world, the space 
between the buildings that I pass and my body usually includes other subjects. These others 
(even if not directly attended) are not merely the static background of the built world around 
me, but rather their bodily presence helps in carrying the flow of my everydayness. First, 
in this case, my attention already includes (and relies on) their attitudes and perspectives 
toward the built environment. Second, their bodily presence helps me in sensing the built 
objects I pass, for example, in utilizing the distance between them and me, and in (better) 
defining my location within the environment. This suggests that directly encountering others 
in the everyday environment reduces my dependency on my own attentional resources. 
In their presence, I no longer need to depend solely on my attentional relation to the built 
objects around me, which enables me to attend to other daily matters as well.
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The same holds for the presence of others in the periphery of my attentional field. Even 
though in this case they are not directly involved in my attentional relation to the built 
objects in my immediate environment, their perspective toward the urban settings is avail-
able to me (to a lesser degree), since they are part of my field of attention. This broadens my 
attention to the built environment and signals for me its everydayness.66 In other words, 
by virtue of the bodily presence of others I can experience built objects in the periphery of 
my attention as part of my mundane world so that I do not need to pay direct attention to 
these objects. This suggests that in daily situations the built world usually appears to the 
subject with two attentional layers: a first person layer, which is my direct attention toward 
the environment, and a second person layer, namely the perspectives of other subjects in 
my attentional field toward this environment. Moreover, I can directly attain the perspec-
tives of other subjects, as in the case when they appear in my attentional field, or indirectly, 
through other subjects in my field who attend to them.
This extended attentional organization enables the everydayness of the built environ-
ment, as it prevents the built world from forcing itself on subjects in daily situations, yet 
allowing them still to attend to it (though in a less demanding way). Consequently, though 
I do not need to focus attention on architecture in everyday life, my attentional relation to 
architectural objects in my immediate environment allows me to carry out different simple 
daily routines as I move through and attend to my urban surroundings. This understanding 
is compatible with Gurwitsch’s notion that shows that attention is primarily a matter of 
organization.67
The experience of the everyday built environment that involves and depends on other 
subjects is far removed from a situation in which I attend to familiar urban settings in mun-
dane circumstances in the absence of others, such as when jogging early in the morning 
on my daily path. Although in these situations I also do not (usually) need to concentrate 
attention on architectural objects, I, nevertheless rely solely on my bodily knowledge, namely 
on my embodied familiarity with the environment. This changes the way the lived urban 
world appears to me compared to the experience of everyday built surroundings in the 
presence of others. More specifically, we suggest that, without others to help in regulating my 
attention, my attentional field tapers, the city loses its depth, and my attention is vulnerable 
to external interruptions, such as unexpected sounds and movements.
4. The influence of bodily others on the subject’s everyday built 
environment
The suggestion that the everydayness of the built environment rests largely on the bodily 
presence of other human subjects in our attentional field is supported by an examination of 
the influence of the absence of others on the subject’s lived urban world. In ordinary circum-
stances, the presence of other subjects in our daily urban surroundings does not surprise 
us. We usually anticipate finding ourselves in their presence; their company is essential for 
our welfare and contributes to our familiar sense of a place.68 This is particularly evident 
when others are no longer available to the subject in the everyday built world, such as, 
when walking late at night through a business district that is busy in the daytime. In these 
situations, the subject immediately focuses attention on the (newly) uncanny surround-
ings, the built context, and its characteristics, which are now colored with unfamiliarity, 
strangeness and uncertainty.
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More specifically, when other subjects are absent from my everyday environment I can 
no longer rely on their perspectives, which are given to me when they are part of my atten-
tional field. Additionally, I immediately lose the unique sense of their bodily presence. 
Consequently, the built environment penetrates into the center of my attention, while the 
periphery of my field of attention dissolves. Furthermore, since in this case I can no longer 
anticipate the moment to come through the bodily kinesthesis of others in my surroundings 
the enactive flow of time is disturbed,69 and the stream of my experience is intruded upon 
by the built world around me. In other words, when other subjects are absent from my 
everyday built world, the structure of my attentional field is changed and the everydayness 
collapses. The built world that was until now barely noticed suddenly discloses itself to me 
in new ways; by now I no longer recognize it as my everyday familiar built environment, 
but rather I experience it as different and eerie.
We find a good illustration of our suggestion in the opening scene of the American-
Spanish movie Vanilla Sky.70 The lead protagonist, David Aames (Tom Cruise), wakes up 
and drives to work through Manhattan’s streets in his black Ferrari. The streets are empty; 
David looks at his watch: the time is 9:00 AM. Through his reaction, we realize that it should 
have been an ordinary midweek morning in the big city, but the urban surrounding is 
clearly different than usual. He continues to drive through a chain of empty urban spaces. 
As the music rises, David reaches Times Square; this most recognized of all commercial 
intersections, known for its crowded, dense appearance, is now motionless and silent. With 
not a single person in sight, David pulls over randomly, exits the car, and leaves it in the 
middle of the street. He begins to walk, faster, then runs, searching in vain for humanity 
(Figure 1). As this is no longer a familiar everyday environment for him, it fails to offer 
a stable, comforting and comprehended space. In the absence of others, the built objects 
around rapidly close in on him, violently penetrating into the center of his attentional field. 
By now, the built environment appears to him in its massive intimidating features. This 
Figure 1. Still from Vanilla sky (Cameron Crowe, 2001), Paramount Pictures.
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situation is somewhat similar to a situation where I walk back home late at night (or very 
early in the morning) through a usually hectic street. The vibrant street is now empty, not 
a person in sight. In these circumstances the familiar environment significantly changes. 
In the absence of others, I focus attention on features that normally I barely notice, such as 
the entrances to the buildings that I pass and the benches on the sidewalk. Though, given 
the late hour, I expected to find myself alone in the street, nevertheless the environment 
forces itself on me, penetrating into the center of my attentional field, while the periphery 
dissolves, as it does for David.
These examples demonstrate the profound influence of the bodily presence of others on 
the subject’s lived urban world. In daily life, other people’s movement, facial expressions and 
bodily gestures are essential for constructing the everydayness of the built environment. 
The immediacy of their bodies, their relation to the built surroundings, and their rhythm, 
speed and directionality, enable me to capture the scale of the environment, its proportions, 
spatiality and edge, and to pre-reflectively apprehend my opportunities to act within it. For 
example, the bodily presence of others in my immediate environment allows me to recog-
nize the optional available directions, helps in keeping me from running into obstacles, and 
prevents the built world from forcing itself on me. When others are no longer available to 
me in the lived urban world, I lose the crucial advantages that their bodily presence enables, 
and the everydayness of the built environment dissolves. In these situations, the built envi-
ronment appears to me as different; it is now an unfamiliar, narrow and strange place for 
me. With no one to carry my attention and verify the world for me, I need to focus on the 
built objects surrounding me, and thus I can no longer perform other tasks. This suggests 
that my everyday urban world presupposes the presence and movements of others, as much 
as it presupposes mine. When others are absent from my everyday built surroundings, even 
in circumstances where I anticipated finding myself alone, the built objects, which usually 
appear in the periphery of my attentional field, capture my full focused attention. In this 
case, my field of attention narrows down to what directly appears in its center, and this 
significantly changes the way the urban world is given to me.
5. Concluding remarks
In everyday life, under normal circumstances, built objects do not appear in the center of 
our attention, yet we attend to them (though to a lesser degree). This attentional experi-
ence is different from the way we attend to exceptional architecture, such as outstanding 
buildings, theaters and places of historical significance. Based on phenomenological and 
architectural considerations we have shown that the scaffolding upon which the everyday 
experience of the built environment is constructed involves the attentional relation of the 
subject’s enactive body to the built world and the bodily presence of other subjects in our 
immediate everyday surroundings.
Following in the footsteps of Gurwitsch,71 our analysis suggests that in daily situations 
in the lived urban world the enactive and wide structure of the subject’s attentional field 
influences the way subjects experience architecture as mundane. In everyday urban settings, 
along with my attention to the built environment, I also regularly attain the perspectives 
and attitudes of others in this environment, to whom I attend. This broadens my attentional 
field in the sense that I do not need to focus attention solely on the built objects, as I do in 
the case of appreciation (or unexpected disturbance). However, normally, these objects still 
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appear to me (to some relatively minimal degree), directly—insofar as they are part of my 
extended attentional field, and indirectly—as a possibility for attention, through the others 
that I encounter. This greatly influences the construction of the experience that Benjamin 
defines as (habitual) distraction;72 therefore, it is involved in allowing human subjects in 
everyday urban environments to carry out simple familiar daily tasks while still attending 
to the environment.
The profound influence of the bodily presence of others on the subject’s lived urban 
environment highlights the intimate relationship between the everyday experience of the 
built world and social attention. Specifically, it shows that attending to, and with others in 
everyday urban surroundings is significantly involved in the way built objects appear to 
the subject. This suggestion clarifies the crucial role of the bodily other in our lived urban 
world and helps to underscore the experiential structure of its everydayness.
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